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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SCOTT M. MATHESON,
Governor, State of
Utah, ·and DAN S.
BUSHNELL, Vice Chairman of the Utah State
Building Ownership
Authority,
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

Plaintiffs,

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

-v-

Case No. 16545

WESTON E. HAMILTON,
Chairman of the Utah
State Building Ownership Authority,
Defendant.

NATURE OF CASE
This is an original action for issuance of Writ of Mandamus,
compelling defendant to sign certain bonds to be issued by the Utah
State Building Ownership Authority.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Defendant seeks dismissal of the Complaint for Writ of Mandamus·and an Order of this Court declaring SB 238, the Utah State Building Ownership Authority Act; SB 237 authorizing the issuance of
$25,000,000 in bonds, and SB 321 authorizing the issuance of 2.6 million
dollars in bonds to be unconstitutional.
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FACTS
Defendant accepts the facts as set forth in plaintiffs'
Brief, with a few additional facts added.
SB 238, creating the State Building Ownership Authority
(hereinafter Authority), expressly requires the Authority to lease
the facilities to be built with the bond issue to only State bodies
defined as the State of Utah and any department, board, commission
or agency thereof, except universities or colleges.
cannot lease to any other entity whatsoever.

The Authority

SB 238, Section 7.

The interest and principal of the bonds must be payable solely out
of the rentals or lease payments received by the Authority from the
State bodies.

SB 238, Section 8.

The Authority is mandatorily re-

quired to secure said bond issue by "a pledge and assignment of the
revenues out of which that obligation shall be made payable." SB 238,
Section 9 (l)(a).

Nothing in any of the acts requires the Authority

to give the bondholders a mortgage or a priority lien position, but
the Authority may do so if it deems it advantageous.

Section 15 of

SB 238 provides that all property acquired or held by the Authority is
declared to be "public property used for essential, public and governmental purposes and shall be exempt from taxation."
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROPOSED BOND ISSUE AND FINANCING SCHEME CONTEMPLATED
BY ALL THREE SENATE BILLS ARE IN VIOLATION OF THE UTAH
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CONSTITUTION.
Article XIII, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution, generally
prohibits the Legislature from incurring any debt unless it has provided for levying a tax annually sufficient to pay the annual interest
and principal of such debt. Article XIII, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution, likewise provides that no appropriation can be made or any
expenditure authorized by the Legislature, whereby the expenditure during any fiscal year would exceed the total tax then provided for by law.
Article XIV, Section 1, provides that the Legislature may not incur any
debt exceeding in the aggregate at any one time an amount equal to

1~

percent of the value of the taxable property of the State. There is no
dispute that the Legislature, when adopting Senate Bills 237, 238, and
321, did not levy a tax sufficient to pay for the debt contemplated by
said acts, and that said debt would exceed the available revenue in the
current year.
It is defendant's contention that the financing scheme set
forth in Senate Bill 238, which authorizes a State Building Ownership
Authority to:

(1) issue bonds; (2) construct a facility which is held

for essential public and governmental purposes; (3) lease to State agencies and State agencies only; (4) repay the bond proceeds from the lease
rentals; and (5) generally acquire the building for the government of
the State of Utah, is unconstitutional.

It is an attempt by the Legis-

lature of the State of Utah to do indirectly what it could not do directly,

-3-
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as such would be a violatipn of the above-cited constitutional provisions.

Defendant submits that a close examination of the proposed

financing scheme will disclose when the substance is viewed rather
than the form, that, in fact, a debt of the State of Utah has been
created.

Defendant also submits that the proposed lease agreements

with State agencies are not lease agreements but rather cleverly
disguised contracts for the purchase of buildings where the Legislature of the State of Utah is the ultimate guarantor and purchaser of
said building.

Defendant also submits that the Building Authority is

really an instrumentality of the State and, as such, pledges the credit
of the State of Utah, notwithstanding the express disclaimers by the
Legislature in the statute that it is not creating a debt of the State
of Utah.
Defendant submits herewith the analysis of six cases from
other jurisdictions which deals with the same fact situation and statutory financing schemes as found in the present case.

In every one of

the six cases cited, the statutes carried express and mandatory disclaimers to the effect that:

(1) a State debt was not created; (2) the

bondholders could not look to the general taxing power of the State to
repay the leases; and (3) nothing could be construed by a court to find
that a debt of the State had been created.

In all of the cases cited,

that legislative disclaimer was required to be placed on the face of the
bonds.

In all of the cases cited, for various reasons, the courts found

-4-
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said financing schem5to be in violation of their respective State
constitutions which generally prohibited incurring debt in excess
of percentage taxable property limitations or incurring debt without
having first submitted the matter to a vote of the people.
·In the case of State ex rel. Nevada Building Authority v.
Hancock, 468 P.2d 333 (Nevada 1970), the Supreme Court of Nevada held
that a statutory financing scheme which would be used to pay rent on
buildings constructed by an independent Authority solely from legislative appropriations was unconstitutional.

The express legislative dis-

claimer that it was not creating a general obligation of the State of
Nevada is referred to in the Court's opinion at page 335.

The Court

held that the· creation of a separate body corporate does not alter the
essence of the financing scheme, and the Building Authority was part of
government since it is managed by public officials and its income depended
on governmental appropriations for rent.

The Court noted:

"Section 8 provides, however, that rentals payable from a State agency may be derived from legislative
appropriations made in each biennium or the legislature may
pledge itself to make future appropriations for rent, either
in full or to the extent not defrayed by revenues. These
provisions are the essence of the financing scheme. The
permissive word 'may', used with regard to legislative appropriations for rent cannot serve to disguise the basic
character of the scheme. Without question, the legislature
will appropriate the needed funds. If it did not do so, the
contemplated public construction for State agency use could
not proceed." At page 336.
The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the Legislature would make the
appropriations, notwithstanding the express legislative disclaimer set
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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set forth in the statute .. The Court stated:
" .•. Within the context of the public building
pregram involved, however, it is our view that successive
biennial appropriations for rent until the bonds issued
by the Authority are fully retired must be considered
in the same light as a legislative pledge to make future
appropriations for the purpose. It is inconceivable that
the legislature would default in either instance since the
good faith of Nevada would not allow it .•.. " At page
338.

The Nevada Supreme Court also examined the "special fund" exception.
This exception generally provides that revenue bonds may be issued not
subject to State constitutional debt limitations if they are to be repaid from proceeds from the use of the facility constructed.

This de-

fendant submits that the special fund doctrine is not applicable when
the revenues from the use of the facility do not come from nongovernmenta 1 sources, usually from private or commercia 1 use of the facilities.
This distinguishes the present case from the cases of Spence v. Utah Stat!
Agriculture College, 225 P.2d 18 (Utah 1950), and Tribe v. Salt Lake

Ci~

540 P.2d 499 (1975), cited by plaintiffs' in their Brief as each of those
cases contemplated the receipt of revenue from the general public which
would offset the cost of operating and constructing the facility andre·
pay the bond proceeds.

The Nevada Supreme Court stated:

" ... To the extent that such revenues are derived from a nongovernmental source, or from rentals
paid by a State agency which in turn derives rent paying income from user fees, a State public debt within
the meaning of the Constitution is not created ....
In such a case the nongovernmental user is the debtor
rather than the State." At page 337. (Citations omitted.)
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In the case of State of Washington v. Yelle, 289 P;2d 355
(Washington 1955), the Washington Supreme Court held unconstitutional
a statute setting up a State Building Financing Authority, as such
would in effect create an installment purchase by the State of certain buildings with State money raised by taxation in excess of the
constitutional debt limitation.

The Court held the scheme unconstitu-

tional.· The express legislative disclaimer found in the statute authorizing the bond issue and reciting that it did not create a general obligation of the State is referred to in the opinion at page 356. The
Washington Supreme Court concluded that the proposed lease arrangement
was, in substance, really a purchase agreement by the State through a
State instrumentality of certain buildings to get around the debt limitations in the Constitution.

The Court concluded that the Building Author-

ity did not deal at arms' length with the various State agencies; that it
was statutorily required to lease to only State agencies, and the relationship was not that of an ordinary landlord and tenant. The Court examined the "special fund" doctrine and concluded that it was inevitable
that to pay off the rentals, "a resort to the general taxation was necessary." The Court stated:
"We recognize the housing problem with which
the State is confronted. Nevertheless, we cannot
permit the exigency of the situation to override the
constitutional safeguard against improvidence and the
integrity of the State's economy. We cannot resort to
dexterity of judicial thinking in order to assist the
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State in its problem. We cannot close our eyes to
what is actually being attempted. When we strip the
plan down to fundamentals, we find that it is not a
leasing arrangement between landlord and tenant,
but the installment purchase by the State of certain buildings and facilities with State moneys raised by taxation
far in excess of the constitutional limitation." At
pages 361, 362.
Defendant submits that the proposed bond issue in the present case is
also, in substance, a purchase agreement by the State of Utah of certain buildings which are declared to be for "public and governmental
purposes" and exempt from taxation.

At the conclusion of the repayment

of the bonds, the buildings will revert to the State of Utah for public
use.

Therefore, the Legislature has done indirectly what it could not

do directly--that is, create a debt in excess of available funds in the
current year to purchase a building.

They have also bound future Legis-

latures to appropriate the funds because the holders of the bonds must
look to the Legislature for payment of the lease and rentals and cannot
look to anyone else.

The Utah statute does not even require granting

the bondholders a mortgage or lien interest in the building, although
under the facts in the present case, the Authority has do so by resolution.
The above-cited Yelle case drew heavily on McCutcheon v. State
Building Authority, 13 N.J. 46, 97 A.2d 663 (1953), wherein the Supreme
Court of the State of New Jersey held a statute creating a Building Owner·
ship Authority violated constitutional provisions prescribing debt limita·
tion when required to lease solely to State agencies and to repay bond
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-8Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
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proceeds from lease rentals.

The express legislative disclaimer

that it was not creating a debt or obligation of the State, or
pledging its faith and credit, is referred to in the opinion at
97 A.2d 663, 666.

The Court stated:

" ... While in form a way of providing the State
with leasehold interests in building facilities for
public use, in reality the design of the act is to enable the State by contracts of purchase to acquire for
State use buildings possessed and constructed by the
Authority by means of bond issues sustained by the State's
promise to supply in the guise of rentals sufficient money
to liquidate the bonds, available only through the medium
of annual appropriations. And this in disregard of the
constitutional debt limitation and the restraints laid by
the organic law upon the appropriation process .••• The
legislation proceeds upon the hYpothesis that the fulfillment of the project will not burden the State with a debt
or liability within the constitutional sense. But in this
the·accent is on the external appearance rather than the
substance. The label is unimportant; it is not the form
but the essence that controls. It is an obvious truism that
constitutional limitations may not be set at naught by indirection." At page 668.
The Court also noted in very strong language at page 666 that the proposed
lease agreement was, in substance and effect, a purchase agreement of
the property, and the Authority could not function were it not for the
appropriation from the Legislature.
actly.

This parallels the Utah statute ex-

The Court noted:
" ... The Authority may 'lease' only to State departments, agencies, and instrumentalities and at a 'rental'
determined by this standard. These are not leases as in the
case of the Prentice Company, but contracts of purchase by
the sovereign for public use; the 'rentals' constitute appropriations made by the State, not alone to provide operating expenses, but in quantum sufficient for the ultimate payment

-9-
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and retirement or the bonds. A true lease rental is
compensation for the use of the property, not the
co~sideration price for its purchase." At page 669.
The significance of the New Jersey Supreme Court decision is not so
much in its conclusion that the leasing device is really an installment purchase by the State or a lease agreement by the State with
itself (at page 671), but in the following express language:
"The constitutional debt-limitation prov1s1on is
not limited in quality and scope to debts enforceable
by action. It has in view the temptation or inducement
and incentive to make appropriations for 'debts' beyond
the prescribed amount, unless approved by the people in
the manner ordained. Moral and ethical compulsions are
not to be allowed to override the constitutional safeguard
against improvidence and the integrity of the State's
economy." At page 671.
The Court also concluded by noting that one Legislature cannot bind a
succeeding Legislature with the duty of making appropriations, as well
as sevenelycritizing the Building Authority for attempting to discover
a legal way to illegally evade the constitutional requirements.

At page

673.

Defendant submits that under the above-cited case, wherein the
New Jersey Supreme Court found that it was not necessary to have a "legaH
enforceable debt" in order to violate the spirit of their constitutional
provisions on debt limitations, that the Utah Legislature has, in fact,
lent the full faith of the State of Utah upon which the bondholders will
surely rely to guaranty that sufficient funds will be appropriated in
each session of the Legislature until the proposed 25 million dollars in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
-10- by the Utah State Library.
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bonds are fully retired.

In this regard, a debt has been created

in violation of the spirit of the constitutional prohibitions on
debt limitations.
In the case of State Office Bldg. Commission v. Trujillo,
46 N.M. 29, 120 P.2d 434 (1942}, the Supreme Court of New Mexico held
unconstitutional a Building Ownership Commission which would incur a
debt to. be repaid entirely from agencies utilizing the facilities.
The express legislative disclaimer that a general obligation debt of
the State of New Mexico was not created is referred to in the opinion
at page 438.

The New Mexico Supreme Court discussed in depth the de-

velopment of the "special fund" doctrine within the State of New Mexico
and concluded that it had no application because the "special fund"
doctrine expressly requires that the monies be derived from sources
other than general taxation, such as private and commercial users of
the facility.

The Court also, in reviewing the application of the

"special fund" doctrine, noted the following regarding constitutional
"debt":
'"Speaking of the term 'debt' as used in article
9, Section 12, of the State Constitution, in Seward Y.
Bowers (37 N.M. 385, 24 P.2d 253}, we said: 'The idea
of a 'debt' in the constitutional sense is that an obligation has arisen out of contract, express or implied, which
entitles the creditor unconditionally to receive from the
debtor· a sum of money, which the debtor is under a legal,
equitable, or moral duty to pay without regard to any
future contingency.'" At page 442.

-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that it was inevitable that to
pay off the rentals, a resort to general taxation is necessary, and,
therefore, the special fund doctrine could not obtain.

The Court

stated:
"'
And, in the case of enterprises authorized
by the Legislature to be embarked upon through State
agencies, a particular scheme of financing will be
held to be valid only where it is clearly demonstrable
from the specific terms of the financing proposal itself that no tax burden or pecuniary liability of the
State to appropriate or pay for the indebtedness about
to be incurred will ever arise, or be looked to as
security, in whole or in part, for repayment of the borrowed moneys.' At page 445.
11

The New Mexico Supreme Court also dealt specifically with the
express legislative disclaimer that it was not creating a debt of the
State of New Mexico by stating:
Such expression /disclaimer of indebtedness of the State of New Mexico/ can be of no force
because the basic purpose, substance and plan of the
Act, and the detailed provisions looking to the
accomplishment of such purpose, show differently. Such
matters are for judicial and not legislative determinaAt page 449. (Bracketed portion added.)
tion.
11

•••

11

In the case of State of

\~est

Virginia ex rel. Hall v. Taylor,

178 S.E. 2d 48 (1970), the West Virginia Supreme Court held unconstitu·
tional a statute authorizing a Building Commission to issue bonds to be
repaid by renting buildings to State agencies, despite a legislative
declaration that a State debt was not created.

The express legislative

disclaimer that it was not creating a general debt of the State of West

-12-
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Virginia or pledging the credit or taxing power of the State for
payment of the rentals, is referred to in the opinion at page 52.
The Court, in holding that the proposed financing scheme was unconstitutional, stated that the "separate fund doctrine" could not
be applied to a fund which is created and maintained, in whole or
in part, by general tax revenues.

They also concluded that the

Court must consider the substance of a plan rather the form, and
said that the financing scheme was an unconstitutional attempt to
bind subsequent Legislatures to make appropriations of monies.
In the case of In re Matter of the Constitutionality of
Chapter 280, Oregon Laws 1975, Martin v. Oregon Building Authority, et
~ .•

276 Or. 135, 554 P.2d 126 (1976), the Supreme Court of Oregon

held unconstitutional a Building Authority Act which would borrow
funds through a bond issue to errect a building to be leased solely
to State agencies, the proceeds to be repaid by lease rentals from
said State agencies.

Reference to the express legislative disclaimer

that a general debt or obligation of the State was not being created
is found at page 127 of the opinion.

The Oregon Supreme Court provided

a historical development of the constitutional provisions regarding
debt limitation.
Generally, debt limitations were in response to heavy borrowing engaged in by many States prior to 1840.

Bond proceeds were utilized

to finance internal improvements, such as canals, railroads, turnpikes,
enlargement of banking facilities, and to open up markets and stimulate
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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commerce.

Following the depression of 1837, many States defaulted

on their obligations during the 1840's.

These embarrassments led to

taxpayer adoptions of constitutional provisions designed to curb
the Legislature's ability to subject tax funds to long-term obligations and debt servicing.

States entering the Union in later years

adopted provisions containing debt limitations.

About thirty years

later, States began requiring, by constitutional provisions, that
local governmental entities could not incur debts above certain limitations.

The predominant purpose of constitutional debt limitations was

the achievement of a high degree of control over debt creation in order
to forestall irresponsibly imposed tax burdens.

Likewise, they were

to be a protection to the people of the whole against burdensome and
excessive taxation to pay for debt obligations incurred in earlier years.
They were also intended to prevent exposing the sources of public revenue
to potential hazard and otherwise impairing the flexibility of planning
and the ability of future Legislatures to avoid a ta1< increase.

Said

debt restrictions were designed to force representatives of the people
to operate the government within its means and remove the temptation to
undertake projects on an "enjoy now, pay later" basis.

This defendant

submits that, if the present financing scheme is approved by this Court
as contemplated by the Utah Legislature, then the floodgates are thrown
open and the Legislature would no longer have to comply with constitutional
requirements that a sufficient tax be levied to pay any debt that is incurred in the current year.

This manifestly violates the spirit of Article
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XIII, Sections 2 and 9, placing limitations upon the Legislature
incurring debt.

It would of necessity render portions of Sections

2 and 9 of Article XIII null and void.
The proposed financing scheme by the Utah Legislature in
the current case is one of several devices designed to skirt debt
limitations.

It basically divorces the borrowing function from the

paying function in what is essentially one integrated transaction.
That is, the borrowing power is located in the State Building Ownership Authority, and the paying function is vested in the Utah Legislature through appropriations for leases and rentals as the Oregon
Supreme Court noted:
"... Use of the authority permits the discretionary incurrence of long-term obligations, which
the state is in substance obligated to repay from
general tax revenues, without limit and without control
by the voters." At page 132.
This defendant submits that the current financing scheme to be
repaid solely from rentals generated by State agencies occupying the
facilities is, in fact, the creation of a obligation of the State of Utah
to which the State's full faith is pledged in violation of the Utah Constitution.

The proposed lease agreements are, in fact, purchase agreements

whereby the State would acquire a building for essential public and governmental purposes.

The Building Ownership Authority is an instrument of

the State of Utah, and, as such, has entered into a contract with the State.
This Court should look to the substance of the proposed financing scheme
rather than the form and conclude that the Utah constitutional provisions
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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- lOCR,
5- may contain errors.

on debt limitations set

fo~th

in Ar icle XIII, Section 2 and

Section 9, and Article XIV, Section

, have in substance been violated

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-16-

